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Research Article
Who is more likely to come up with the next scientific 
breakthrough in the field of chemistry, a cultural anthro-
pologist or a chemical engineer? Scholars have provided 
a number of strong arguments about why a chemical 
engineer (i.e., an insider) rather than an anthropologist 
(i.e., an outsider) might be more likely to demonstrate 
scientific creativity. After all, insiders know the territory, 
which is often considered to be a prerequisite for 
being able to make a novel contribution to a knowledge 
domain  (e.g., Amabile, 1983; Weisberg, 1999). From a 
cognitive perspective, obtaining “mental representations 
that support reasoning” is considered a necessary first 
step for scientists in enabling them to generate new ideas 
(Ericsson, 1999, p. 332).
Historically, however, outsiders have been responsible 
for some major breakthroughs in various scientific 
domains, such as medicine (Ben-David, 1960) and biol-
ogy (Mullins, 1972). Outsiders may have an advantage 
over insiders when it comes to solving scientific prob-
lems that require novelty because they have access to 
perspectives from their own domain that might be fresh 
and novel for the other domain (e.g., Jeppesen & Lakhani, 
2010; Kuhn, 1962). In addition, the acquisition of domain 
knowledge has been associated with increased inflexibil-
ity (Dane, 2010; Lewandowsky & Kirsner, 2000; Sternberg 
& Lubart, 1995). One notable example with rich empiri-
cal evidence is the Einstellung effect (e.g., Bilalic´ , McLeod, 
& Gobet, 2008a; Lovett & Anderson, 1996; Luchins, 1942), 
which occurs “when the first idea that comes to mind, 
triggered by previous experience with similar situations, 
prevents alternatives being considered” (Bilalic´ , McLeod, 
& Gobet, 2008b, p. 553). It is often argued that such limi-
tations occur because people’s domain knowledge affects 
their initial mental representation of a problem and thus 
subsequently shapes the solutions that they come up 
with. With particularly intractable problems, that initial 
representation can be hard to shake off, even though the 
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Abstract
Prior research has provided conflicting arguments and evidence about whether people who are outsiders or insiders 
relative to a knowledge domain are more likely to demonstrate scientific creativity in that particular domain. We propose 
that the nature of the relationship between creativity and the distance of an individual’s expertise from a knowledge 
domain depends on his or her cognitive processes of problem solving (i.e., cognitive-search effort and cognitive-search 
variation). In an analysis of 230 solutions generated in a science contest platform, we found that distance was positively 
associated with creativity when problem solvers engaged in a focused search (i.e., low cognitive-search variation) 
and exerted a high level of cognitive effort. People whose expertise was close to a knowledge domain, however, 
were more likely to demonstrate creativity in that domain when they drew on a wide variety of different knowledge 
elements for recombination (i.e., high cognitive-search variation) and exerted substantial cognitive effort.
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proposed solutions may have proved inadequate (Bilalic´ 
et  al., 2008b; Kaplan & Simon, 1990; Smith, 1995). 
Because they are constantly exposed to domain knowl-
edge, insiders are more prone than outsiders to problems 
of inflexibility.
Some evidence suggests that both insiders and outsid-
ers can be a source of creative ideas; however, the precise 
role played by the distance between an individual’s exper-
tise and a particular knowledge domain, or knowledge 
distance, remains unclear. Perhaps the right question is 
not whether people whose expertise is distant from a 
knowledge domain are more likely to demonstrate cre-
ativity than those whose expertise is closer to that domain, 
but rather when they might do so. Specifically, taking into 
account how individuals solve problems might help to 
shed light on conflicting arguments about the relationship 
between creativity and knowledge distance; creativity is 
dependent not only on the initial mental representation of 
the problem (which is affected by the distance between 
one’s expertise and the knowledge domain), but also on 
the way in which different solutions to the problem are 
explored (e.g., Amabile, 1983; Campbell, 1960; Schilling, 
2005; Simonton, 2003). Prior research has suggested that 
the primary sources of creativity are cognitive-search pro-
cesses (i.e., ways to explore solutions) that lead people to 
see novel associations between existing ideas, concepts, 
and knowledge elements (Hennessey & Amabile, 2010; 
Mednick, 1962; Mobley, Doares, & Mumford, 1992; Mum-
ford & Gustafson, 1988). Albert Einstein, for example, 
emphasized the importance of novel associations for his 
own creative processes: “The psychical entities which 
seem to serve as elements in thought are certain signs and 
more or less clear images which can be combined. . . . 
This combinatory play seems to be the essential feature in 
productive thought” (Mednick, 1962, p. 220).
Two main cognitive processes are identified as critical 
for effective recombination of different knowledge ele-
ments. The first process is cognitive-search variation, or 
simply search variation, which refers to variation in 
terms of the knowledge elements used for recombina-
tion. This process is likely to enhance the chances of 
making a novel association because drawing on more 
elements implies a larger number of potential connec-
tions between them. Schilling and Green (2011), for 
example, found that when scientists draw on more 
knowledge domains for their articles (i.e., cite articles 
from a variety of disciplines), they are more likely to 
make atypical associations between disciplines and pro-
duce high-impact articles. The second process, cognitive-
search effort, or simply search effort, is the amount of 
attention devoted to creating a novel solution and is 
related to the intensity aspect of attention (Kahneman, 
1973). Search effort is important because it increases 
one’s cognitive-processing capacity to notice connections 
between different elements and to make sense of these 
connections in such a way that they can be recombined 
to generate a novel solution to a given problem (De 
Dreu, Baas, & Nijstad, 2008; Li, Maggitti, Smith, Tesluk, & 
Katila, 2013).
Our hypothesis was that the relationship between the 
distance from one’s expertise to a particular knowledge 
domain and one’s creativity in that domain depends on 
the cognitive-search processes (i.e., search effort and 
search variation) in which one engages. In other words, 
we expected that cognitive processes that led to the spot-
ting of novel associations (and, in turn, to greater creativ-
ity) would differ for people according to their knowledge 
distance. People whose expertise lay within (or close to) 
a particular domain were expected to see these novel 
associations by defocusing (i.e., seeking out a wider vari-
ety of possible knowledge sources); this would enable 
them to (a) avoid the tendency to gravitate toward the 
usual solutions and (b) increase the number of novel 
knowledge elements to recombine.
Going outside the domain is likely to help people 
overcome a fixation (e.g., Einstellung) that can arise 
because they are drawing instinctively on their existing 
domain knowledge. Therefore, going outside the domain 
may activate a more flexible mind-set, one characterized 
by avoidance of conventional routes of thinking. This 
sort of mind-set, which can be referred to as a think- 
different mind-set, might be helpful in going beyond typ-
ical associations between knowledge elements (Sassen-
berg & Moskowitz, 2005). A broader search in different 
domains is also likely to allow these individuals to access 
additional knowledge elements that they can use as a 
basis for forming novel associations. At the same time, 
using this much wider knowledge base effectively 
requires problem solvers to make substantial cognitive 
effort. This is because realizing the full potential of these 
diverse knowledge elements requires one to allocate sig-
nificant cognitive capacity to making sense of these unfa-
miliar elements and exploring new connections between 
them (Li et al., 2013).
As knowledge distance increases, however, greater 
focus (i.e., limited search variation) is expected to be the 
mechanism through which one sees novel associations. 
With that growing distance, the ability to make connec-
tions between novel elements in one’s own domain and 
the unfamiliar domain becomes vitally important in 
terms of finding a creative solution to the problem. 
Familiarizing oneself with a new domain is critical to 
being able to transfer novel perspectives to that domain, 
and a more focused search will therefore result in greater 
creativity than a search that covers a wide variety of 
domains. A focused search of this kind will require a 
considerable search effort because making a connection 
between two distant fields is cognitively demanding 
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(Fleming, 2001). It is worth noting that we expect that 
exposure to a problem that is distant from one’s field of 
expertise will activate a think-different mind-set for out-
siders (similar to the expected impact of high search 
variation for insiders), and this is likely to facilitate the 
forming of novel associations between different knowl-
edge elements.
We assessed the relationship among knowledge dis-
tance, cognitive processes of problem solving, and cre-
ativity in the context of science contests. Our data from 
230 people who generated solutions to real science prob-
lems supported our prediction that creativity is signifi-
cantly associated with the interaction between an 
individual’s knowledge distance and his or her cognitive-
search effort and cognitive-search variation.
Method
Empirical setting
This study was conducted in collaboration with InnoCen-
tive, an online, global, prize-based science-contest plat-
form. We selected this particular context for three reasons. 
First, this platform offered a unique opportunity to study 
the role of knowledge distance in creativity, given that 
people from all over the world from different back-
grounds participated in these contests. Second, this plat-
form involved real-world science problems, which 
typically arose in research and development departments 
within organizations and were thus of high external 
validity. Third, these contests offered great potential for 
finding solutions to challenging scientific problems in 
various scientific disciplines, and it was therefore impor-
tant to have an understanding of how they worked.
InnoCentive acts as an intermediary between its cli-
ents and its community. When a client shares a specific 
problem with InnoCentive, the problem is posted on the 
InnoCentive online platform in the form of a contest. 
People interested in solving the problem read the descrip-
tion of it and submit their solutions in the form of a writ-
ten report. The client assesses the submissions, selects 
the winning solution, and gives a monetary prize to the 
winner. Note that InnoCentive also posts nonscientific 
problems, such as those related to business models or 
marketing. To remain focused on scientific problem solv-
ing, we investigated two specific types of contests that 
focus exclusively on scientific problems: reduction-to-
practice contests (i.e., those that require a detailed 
description of the solution and physical evidence proving 
that the solution will work) and theoretical contests (i.e., 
those that require a detailed description of the solution 
and supporting precedents for the solution). An example 
of a reduction-to-practice challenge is development of 
“an enzyme stabilizer at high pH”; an example of a 
theoretical challenge is formulation of “a simple, stable, 
and safe injectable suspension placebo that has no phar-
macological and biological activity” ( Jeppesen & Lakhani, 
2010, p. 1021).
Sample and data collection
We drew on different sources of data to measure inde-
pendent and dependent variables. Independent variables 
were measured using a Web survey, and the dependent 
variable was extracted from company archives. Our sam-
ple consisted of all participants in reduction-to-practice 
and theoretical contests in the 2.5 years before the data 
collection (between December 2009 and May 2012). 
Using contact information from InnoCentive, we sent an 
e-mail to 3,005 solvers. This customized e-mail contained 
a URL link to the survey and asked for information relat-
ing to one specific contest—the last one for which the 
respondent had submitted a solution. In an attempt to 
increase the response rate, we sent a reminder 1 week 
after the initial e-mail, at a different time of day on a dif-
ferent day of the week, and we changed the text of the 
initial e-mail. In total, 744 responses were received, cor-
responding to a 24.8% response rate. Of these, 646 
(21.5%) were usable for further analysis (i.e., respondents 
had answered at least one question relating to the inde-
pendent variables of this study). Our survey included all 
contests, including those that were still open, under eval-
uation, or withdrawn. We therefore took a subsample of 
contests that had a selected winner at the time of data 
collection. The findings reported in the article are based 
on the data from this subsample, which consisted of 230 
respondents (207 male, 12 female, 11 with unreported 
gender). The average age of our sample was 44.29 years 
(SD = 14.44), and 82.6% had at least an undergraduate 
degree (for discussion and analyses relating to potential 
response bias, see the Supplemental Material available 
online).
Measures
To assess knowledge distance, we used a self-report 
measure developed by Jeppesen and Lakhani (2010). 
Respondents rated the extent to which the problem they 
had solved was within their field of expertise on a scale 
from 1 to 7 (1 = inside my field of expertise, 4 = at the 
boundary of my field of expertise, 7 = outside my field of 
expertise). We validated our measure of knowledge dis-
tance against experience of solving similar problems. 
When an individual’s expertise is distant from the knowl-
edge domain of a problem, he or she will not have been 
exposed to current thinking and practices in that domain 
(Kuhn, 1962; Weisberg, 1999) and is unlikely to have 
encountered similar problems. Our data confirmed this 
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expectation: The correlation between knowledge dis-
tance and experience in solving similar problems was 
negative and significant (r = −0.40, p < .001, N = 227). 
Experience was measured by asking respondents to 
report their experience in solving similar problems on a 
scale from 1 to 7 (1 = not experienced at all, 4 = moder-
ately experienced, 7 = very experienced).
Cognitive-search variation was measured with two 
items developed on the basis of prior literature (De Dreu 
et  al., 2008; Schilling & Green, 2011; Simonton, 2003). 
Respondents were asked to indicate the extent to which 
they had drawn on a variety of related and different 
domains while developing the solution, using a scale 
from 1 to 7 (1 = single domain, 4 = moderate variety of 
domains, 7 = wide variety of domains; α = .89). To avoid 
ambiguity, we provided the respondents with an explan-
atory text: “Solvers might solve the challenges by inten-
sively using their knowledge of a single knowledge 
domain or by incorporating their knowledge of various 
domains.” We validated the search-variation measure 
against social network ties (i.e., the number of ties con-
tacted in relation to problem solving). Prior research 
identified social network ties as a main source for access 
and exposure to diverse information that can be used for 
conceptual associations (Granovetter, 1973; Perry-Smith, 
2006); the number of ties should therefore be positively 
correlated with the variation measure. The correlation 
between search variation and number of ties was positive 
and significant (r = 0.17, p = .010, N = 217), confirming 
our expectation. The number of ties was assessed by 
counting how many people an individual contacted, con-
sulted, or interacted with when devising the solution.
Cognitive-search effort was assessed by asking respon-
dents to report how much time they had spent devis-
ing  their solution—a commonly used indicator of the 
amount of cognitive resources expended in a task (e.g., 
Garbarino & Edell, 1997). Specifically, solvers were asked 
to indicate the total number of hours they had spent gen-
erating their final solution, and this included thinking 
about the solution, reading and researching it, and dis-
cussing it with other people. This variable was log- 
transformed because of high skewness. Single-item self-
report measures of cognitive effort have been widely 
used in prior research, and their construct validity is 
extensively documented (e.g., Yeo & Neal, 2004, 2008).
With respect to the dependent variable, we calculated 
an individual’s likelihood of proposing a winning solu-
tion to the contest (i.e., odds of winning). The data for 
this variable were collected from the archives of Inno-
Centive, and the variable was coded as 0 if a solution was 
not a winner and 1 if it was a winner. The main rationale 
behind using this variable was that a winning solution 
was selected on the basis of its creativity—that is, it was 
the most creative solution generated for a certain 
problem. There is no universally accepted definition of 
creativity, but scholars often agree that creativity involves 
an element of novelty and usefulness from the perspec-
tive of the domain or of the organizations concerned 
(Hennessey & Amabile, 2010).
To investigate the extent to which the solutions were 
selected according to their creativity, we conducted seven 
semistructured in-depth interviews with employees in 
InnoCentive who had extensive knowledge of how com-
panies select winning solutions. Specifically, we inter-
viewed all employees who were responsible for mediating 
the communication between companies and individual 
problem solvers (i.e., innovation program managers and 
assistants). This communication included written feed-
back about why each solution in our sample had or had 
not been a winner. These employees also worked with 
the companies to draw up problem descriptions, and this 
required them to engage in extensive discussions about 
what the companies expected from a winning solution. 
We therefore thought it was reasonable to expect these 
employees to be informed about the main criteria for 
selecting winning solutions.
The interviews confirmed our expectation that winning 
solutions are selected on the basis of their creativity— 
winning solutions demonstrate outstanding performance 
in terms of novelty (i.e., novel for the organization that 
has posted the problem and different from the solutions 
submitted by other participants) and are also potentially 
useful (i.e., valuable to the organization in terms of 
solving the problem). Some illustrative quotes from the 
interviews include: “[to win] you do not just need a solu-
tion but the most novel solution,” “[companies that post 
the problems] evaluate . . . [solutions] on the basis of 
novelty and feasibility [i.e., whether it can potentially be 
used by  the company]” or “[companies that post the 
problems want] a novel idea meeting all the [solution] 
requirements.”
On a related note, because companies that post the 
problems provide significant monetary prizes for win-
ning solutions and for the transfer of intellectual property 
rights from the winner, it might be reasonable to expect 
that the solution should be deemed valuable (i.e., poten-
tially useful) and novel (i.e., different from existing solu-
tions that the company itself may have generated). It is 
also worth noting that the problems in our sample were 
real problems that the research-and-development depart-
ments of the companies concerned have often been 
unable to solve. Consequently, finding answers to these 
problems is expected to require creativity because the 
solutions are not obvious, cannot be reached by follow-
ing established procedures, and are not known in 
advance. The foregoing might suggest, therefore, that the 
odds of winning provide an appropriate indicator of cre-
ativity. Other scholars have also adopted a similar 
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approach and used the odds of creating the most suc-
cessful outcomes in creative tasks (e.g., new product ide-
ation, academic writing, and patented inventions) as an 
indicator of creativity (e.g., Bayus, 2013; Schilling & 
Green, 2011; Singh & Fleming, 2010).
Finally, we included the total number of solutions sub-
mitted for the contest as a control variable in our model 
because the number of competing proposals would have 
a direct influence on the odds of winning (for further 
discussion regarding measurement protocols, see the 
Supplemental Material).
Results
Means, standard deviations, and correlations are reported 
in Table S1 in the Supplemental Material. We used a hier-
archical logistic regression model to assess the interactive 
effects of knowledge distance, search variation, and 
search effort on the likelihood of generating the winning 
solution. To create two-way interaction variables, we 
multiplied standardized versions of respective variables. 
To create a three-way interaction term, we multiplied 
standardized knowledge-distance, search-variation, and 
search-effort variables. We entered these variables in the 
first step; two-way interactions between these variables 
in the second step; and the three-way interaction variable 
in the third step. The results of this analysis are presented 
in Table 1. As expected, the three-way interaction was 
significant (odds ratio = 0.48, p = .008). In terms of model 
fit, adding the three-way interaction variable in Step 3 
provided an overall good fit and accounted for signifi-
cantly more variance than the previous model (i.e., the 
model with independent predictors and two-way interac-
tions), χ2(8) = 23.09, p = .003, Δχ2(1) = 7.25, p = .007. 
None of the other models provided as good a fit (see the 
footnote in Table 1).
It is also worth noting that search effort was signifi-
cantly related to the likelihood of winning (odds ratio = 
3.45, p = .013), whereas knowledge distance and search 
variation were not. Adding these three variables in Step 1 
provided a marginally better fit than the intercept-and-
covariate-only model, Δχ2(3) = 7.18, p = .066. The two-
way interactions between knowledge distance and search 
effort (odds ratio = 1.67, p = .080) and between knowl-
edge distance and search variation (odds ratio = 0.65, p = 
.077) were marginally significant, whereas the interaction 
between search effort and variation was not significant 
(odds ratio = 1.01, p > .250). The addition of the two-way 
interactions accounted for more variance than the model 
with independent predictors only, Δχ2(3) = 8.60, p = .035 
(for a discussion of the robustness of these results, see 
the Supplemental Material).
To facilitate the interpretation of this interaction, we 
plotted how knowledge distance was related to likeli-
hood of winning at low and high levels of search varia-
tion and search effort (i.e., at 1 SD below the mean and 
1 SD above the mean, respectively). Figure 1 depicts 
these relationships and shows that knowledge distance 
was positively related to the likelihood of winning 
when search variation was low but search effort was 
Table 1. Results of the Hierarchical Logistic Regression Analyses Predicting Winning Solutions 
in Science Contests
Predictor Odds ratio 95% CI p
Intercept 0.03 < .001
Number of submissions (covariate) 1.01 [1.00, 1.01] > .250
Independent predictors (Step 1)  
Knowledge distance 0.99 [0.76, 1.29] > .250
Search effort (log) 3.45 [1.31, 9.10] .013
Search variation 0.94 [0.69, 1.27] > .250
Two-way interactions (Step 2)  
Knowledge Distance × Search Variation 0.65 [0.40, 1.05] .077
Knowledge Distance × Search Effort 1.67 [0.94, 2.95] .080
Search Effort × Search Variation 1.01 [0.59, 1.73] > .250
Three-way interaction (Step 3)  
Knowledge Distance × Search Effort × Search Variation 0.48 [0.28, 0.82] .008
Note: N = 218. The odds-of-winning variable was coded as 0 if a solution was not a winner and as 1 if it was 
a winner. The intercept-and-covariate-only model did not provide a good fit, χ2(1) = 0.06, p = .802. Including 
the independent predictors in Step 1 also did not lead to a good fit, χ2(4) = 7.24, p = .124, Δχ2(3) = 7.18, p = 
.066. Adding two-way interactions in Step 2 led to a better model fit, χ2(7) = 15.84, p = .027, Δχ2(3) = 8.60, 
p = .035. Adding the three-way interaction in Step 3 provided a significantly better fit and explained more 
variance, χ2(8) = 23.09, p = .003, Δχ2(1) = 7.25, p = .007. These results and regression coefficients remained 
similar when the covariate was not included in the model. CI = confidence interval.
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high. However, knowledge distance was negatively 
related to the likelihood of winning when both search 
variation and search effort were high. The association 
between knowledge distance and creativity was negli-
gible when search effort was low, regardless of whether 
search variation was high or low. Overall, problem 
solvers whose expertise was highly distant from the 
knowledge domain and who were engaged in a high 
level of search effort, but who had a low level of search 
variation, had the highest odds of winning the science 
contest.
To show how the interactive effect of search effort and 
search variation was associated with creativity for outsid-
ers and insiders (i.e., for individuals who are 1 SD above 
the mean and 1 SD below the mean of the knowledge-
distance score, respectively), we created two two-way 
interaction graphs (Fig. 2). Not surprisingly, for both out-
siders and insiders, the odds of winning were quite low 
when the level of search effort was low, regardless of the 
level of search variation (i.e., search variation was not 
related to creativity when search effort was low). For 
high levels of search effort, variation was negatively 
related to creativity for outsiders, whereas this associa-
tion was positive for insiders.
Discussion
In this study, we investigated how individuals’ creativity 
in a scientific domain is related to their knowledge dis-
tance from that particular domain. Our results showed 
that the relationship between knowledge distance and 
creativity depended on the extent of cognitive-search 
effort and search variation. We found that individuals’ 
knowledge distance was positively related to creativity 
only when they engaged in a focused search (i.e., they 
did not vary the search a great deal) and exerted a con-
siderable amount of effort. However, being closer to the 
knowledge domain was positively associated with cre-
ativity when an individual combined a wide variety of 
different knowledge elements and exerted substantial 
search effort. It is worth noting that the creativity we refer 
to is closer to what some scholars call radical creativity, 
“big C” creativity, or eminent creativity, which concerns 
breakthrough ideas that are substantially different from 
existing ideas; this is distinct from incremental creativity, 
“little C” creativity, or everyday creativity, which concerns 
refinements, minor adaptations, or extensions of existing 
ideas (Hennessey & Amabile, 2010; Madjar, Greenberg, & 
Chen, 2011). As a whole, this study provides a cognitive 
account that may explain conflicting evidence with 
regard to the link between knowledge distance and cre-
ativity (Dane, 2010; Weisberg, 1999).
This contribution, however, must be qualified in the 
light of two important limitations of this study. First, the 
data collected in this study were correlational in nature. 
Although the data enabled us to observe how naturally 
occurring variations in knowledge distance and cognitive-
search behavior were related to creativity in the solving of 
real-world science problems, it did not allow a precise 
determination of causality. We therefore encourage future 
researchers to use experimental manipulations to show 
more explicitly the causal role of search behavior in influ-
encing creativity. The second limitation is that the inde-
pendent variables of this study relied on self-report 
measures. Although our knowledge-distance and search-
variation measures were validated against theoretically rel-
evant constructs, and prior empirical evidence supports 
construct and predictive validity of self-report measures 
for search effort (Yeo & Neal, 2004, 2008), it would be 
valuable to use objective measures of these constructs in 
future studies. For example, social desirability might have 
led to biases in the measurement of our independent vari-
ables, or our respondents might not have had the ability to 
assess these variables accurately. This second point may 
not be of great concern, however, given that most of the 
respondents in our sample had a master’s or doctoral 
degree in a scientific field. It might also be worth noting 
that the main emphasis in this work was on the interaction 
effect of self-report measures on an objective dependent 
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Fig. 1. The relationship between knowledge distance and odds of 
winning a science contest for solutions at low and high levels of search 
variation and search effort. High and low refer to values 1 SD above the 
mean and 1 SD below the mean, respectively.
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measure; in such cases, the chances of creating artificial 
links because of method biases are slim (Evans, 1985; Pod-
sakoff, Mackenzie, Lee, & Podsakoff, 2003).
From a practical standpoint, our findings offer a way in 
which insiders may overcome their widely noted prob-
lems related to creativity (Sternberg & Lubart, 1995; Weis-
berg, 1999). That is, if insiders of a particular domain 
spend significant amounts of time seeking out knowledge 
from a wide variety of other fields, they are more likely to 
be creative in that domain. The findings also indicate that 
if solvers’ attention is focused on a relatively restricted 
range of knowledge areas while they are also making a 
considerable cognitive effort, the solvers’ knowledge dis-
tance can turn their lack of knowledge in a domain into 
an advantage. In addition, for organizers of science con-
tests (and other organizations that aim to stimulate scien-
tific development, such as those that provide funding for 
research), our results emphasize the importance of being 
open to those outside a scientific domain. Such organiza-
tions could take a more proactive approach to encourag-
ing outsiders, who are more likely to solve challenging 
scientific problems when they engage in the “right” cogni-
tive processes. We hope this study will help to harness 
more effectively the remarkable creative potential of peo-
ple from a variety of knowledge backgrounds to solve 
significant scientific problems.
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Fig. 2. Odds of winning a science contest as a function of search varia-
tion for solutions at high and low levels of search effort. Results are pre-
sented separately for (a) outsiders and (b) insiders. High and low refer 
to levels 1 SD above the mean and 1 SD below the mean, respectively. 
The shaded regions indicate 95% confidence intervals.
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